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From Substance
Richard A. Epstein t
In their separate contributions to this issue of the Yale Law Journal,
Professor Frank Michelman1 and my colleague Professor Cass Sunstein2
sketch out their respective modern visions of republicanism in both consti-
tutional law and political theory. In this brief comment it is impossible to
address the many issues that they raise, or to follow each author down the
many byways that he chooses to travel. But it is both possible and impor-
tant to isolate several themes, recurrent in both pieces, that seem central to
their conception of modern republicanism. These themes, when fully un-
derstood, point out the serious weaknesses of modern republicanism as a
comprehensive political theory. The overall conclusion can be stated very
quickly. No political theory can concentrate on process and deliberation to
the exclusion of substantive concerns. Yet that is precisely what
Michelman and Sunstein heroically try to do.
The different parts of this essay in their separate ways all pursue their
failure to come to grips with the substantive components of republicanism.
The first section explores the extent to which Michelman and Sunstein
can separate the procedural and deliberative elements of modern republi-
canism from the substantive and controversial outlook of the classical re-
publican writers. The second section turns to a comparison of republican-
ism, as both Michelman and Sunstein reconstruct it, and its nemesis,
interest group pluralism. I argue that both Michelman and Sunstein over-
simplify the opposition because they do not draw sufficient distinctions
between the normative and descriptive accounts of the pluralist position.
This failure in turn leads them to dismiss, with scarcely a mention, the
theories that have a Lockean emphasis on limited government and private
property. In the third section I suggest that these theories offer a superior
response to the pluralist nightmare Sunstein and Michelman describe.
While both men praise the virtues of deliberation, they do not give us any
guidance as to the form that deliberation should take or the ends that it
should seek. Quite the opposite, as I argue in the fourth section, they only
t James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Gerhard Casper, David Currie,
Larry Kramer, and Michael McConnell gave extensive and valuable comments on an earlier draft of
this paper. Sean Smith provided helpful research assistance.
1. See Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
2. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1564 (1988).
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reinforce the position of the pluralists because their own papers dwell too
long on abstraction and speculation. Their arguments are far less satisfac-
tory when they deal with particular issues, be it restrictions on campaign
expenditures, environmental protection, antidiscrimination laws, or rights
of privacy. The weakness of their institutional analysis accentuates the
substantive weaknesses of the republican agenda. Finally, in the fifth sec-
tion I argue that their own republican viewpoint cannot answer the major
challenge of modern constitutional law: the development of a substantive
theory which demarcates the zone of collective legislative control from the
zone of entrenched individual rights.
I. REPUBLICANISM: SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL
As the leading exponents of the modern republican revival, Michelman
and Sunstein mine a rich historical tradition, for republicanism is a self-
conscious point of view that dates as far back as the Greek city-states and
the early Roman republic of the Gracchi. Over the centuries republican-
ism has found voice in the Italian city states, in English political thought,
and, most importantly for these purposes, in the American debate at the
founding of the Constitution.3 In its earlier historical sense, the republican
tradition was very broad indeed. With only a little loss of accuracy, it
could be said to have embraced all those thinkers who thought that politi-
cal power should be exercised by the people or their representatives, and
not by a single individual with royal prerogative power. By this standard
all traditional defenses based upon the divine rights of kings were outside
the republican tradition. So too was the work of Thomas Hobbes, who in
The Leviathan sought to demonstrate how the well-nigh absolute power
of the sovereign derived ultimately from the rational consent of the gov-
erned. Remaining within the republican tradition were all theories that
shared the common premise that governance was the collective responsibil-
ity of the people who were governed. By this litmus test the early Roman
Republic stood in stark contrast to the Roman Empire of Augustus that
displaced it. Similarly, in the context of English political thought, republi-
canism was an attack on the dominant institutions of Feudalism and Roy-
alism, as traditionally understood. Defined in structural terms, republi-
canism could and did include within its capacious confines thinkers who
disagreed on a wide range of issues-such as Harrington, Locke, and
Adams.4
3. For the most exhaustive account on the development, see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVEL-
LIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
(1975).
4. "The Brookes, Hampdens, Vanes, Seldens, Miltons, Nedhams, Harringtons, Nevilles, Sidneys,
Lockes are all said to have owed their eminence in political knowledge to the tyrannies of those reigns
[of the first James and the first Charles]." J. ADAMS, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,
in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS ON JOHN ADAMS: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 20 (G. Peek ed.
1954).
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So long as monarchic power remained a viable alternative to democratic
or representative institutions, these inevitable differences in outlook among
the republicans did not assume any fundamental status. All versions of
republicanism were united by what they stood against, notwithstanding
latent differences over what they stood for. But with the republican suc-
cess in overwhelming monarchic conceptions of government,5 the differ-
ences within this tradition quickly assumed far greater importance.
Understood in some narrower sense, republicanism stood in opposition
to other forms of democratic and constitutional theory, such as Lockean
natural rights and social contract theory.6 The single belief in popular
government was no longer sufficient to distinguish the republicans from
their new rivals. Republicanism in this narrower historical sense had a
strong substantive component, which contained, and prominently dis-
played, militarist, elitist, religious, and sexist sentiments that both Profes-
sors Michelman and Sunstein explicitly disavow.' Their disavowal comes
at some cost because it makes it difficult to explain the coherence and
appeal of republicanism as a historical movement. There was an underly-
ing, if not wholly attractive, unity in these substantive portions of republi-
can theory. The conditions in ancient times were not those of peace and
harmony throughout the world. All citizens had to be ready to defend the
state against its external enemies. Cities had to be defended by extensive
and costly fortifications. Provisions, especially water, had to be stored to
withstand long sieges. Those who miscalculated could find their homes
sacked and their populations massacred. A very large fraction of social
output was spent on aggression and defense. The everpresent facts of life
forced everyone to think hard of the obligations of citizenship and the
powerful demands of the public domain. Military service-with its sup-
porting social institutions-necessarily occupied a far more prominent
place in the life of the polity than it does today. The belief in the country
against the city, the trust in countrymen and the suspicion of foreigners
whose loyalties may lie elsewhere, the insistence on the strenuous life
against the life of luxury, the dominance of men over women, all followed
from the effort to insure that national security was not undone by individ-
ual, selfish pursuits.
In this environment, deliberation and participation were best under-
stood as part of a system designed to forge the internal unity and moral
cohesion necessary to maintain the common defense. The republic would
not survive unless there was a clear consensus regarding the need and
desirability not only of fighting, but also of maintaining a constant readi-
5. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, A FIRsT TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690). With its attack on Sir
Robert Filmer, this is perhaps the decisive text.
6. Pocock, for example, does not treat Locke in any detail in his account of "Atlantic Republican-
ism." J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 423-24.
7. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 1, at 1495; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1539-40.
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ness to fight. Even here there were limits to open and complete political
discourse, which created tensions for the classical republicans just as they
do for us. When the time for action was at hand, military imperatives
demanded hierarchical command structures, not collective deliberation. In
times of war, the republic depended upon the consuls and generals, not on
the senate and the plebes. The sovereign importance of the individual and
the collective importance of public debate both presuppose a level of peace
and security that republican theorists did not find in their historical stud-
ies or observe in their contemporary affairs. Political deliberation and par-
ticipation can be elevated into overarching values only when military
preparedness becomes the obligation of a specialized professional class.
These values cannot flourish in a state when to be a citizen is also to be a
soldier. The transformation of classical to modern republicanism that both
Michelman and Sunstein seek is not some refinement of classical doctrine.
It is in large measure a new theory which borrows selectively, and seduc-
tively, from the past.
II. REPUBLICANISM AND PLURALISM
Michelman and Sunstein, then, are less than contextual when they offer
us a republicanism of participation and deliberation. But, taking them at
their word, it becomes important to ask how this republican position dif-
fers from, say, the Lockean one, and what makes it a preferable political
or constitutional philosophy. Michelman and Sunstein give essentially the
same answer to this question. As they understand republicanism, its cen-
tral focus is not on Lockean property rights and limited government, but
on the nature and character of the collective political process within a
system of representative government. The key elements of that process are
"deliberation" for Sunstein8 and "public practical reason" for Michelman.
The theory thus allows for, in Michelman's words, the possibility that
individuals can "communicate such material in ways that move each
other's views on disputed normative issues towards felt (not merely strate-
gic) agreement, without deception, coercion, or other manipulation."9
Notwithstanding differences in terminology, both Michelman and Sun-
stein see in politics something more than the petty, factional struggles of
self-interested individuals who enter into the political arena in order to
maximize their individual welfare, no matter what costs are thereby im-
posed upon other persons in society. In their view, republicanism is an
uneasy cross between aspiration and description. It is possible for individ-
8. Sunstein qualifies the position to make sure that it is deliberation among political equals over
matters of universal concern with the participation of broad segments of the population. In contrast, I
regard deliberation as the primary virtue, and his other three points as elaborative of the central ideal.
9. Michelman, supra note 1, at 1507. The reference to practical reason seems here to have a
heavy and intended Kantian overtone. See Michelman, supra, at 1511-12 (describing what the plu-
ralist "denies," and what he accepts).
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uals to put aside their own short term welfare in order to enter into a
collective and disinterested search for the common good. It is possible for
political discourse to be more than a sham that cloaks the consuming
search for private advantage. It is possible to make arguments to show
that one substantive position is correct, and that its rival is in error, so
that all will emerge wiser after deliberation than they were before it. Citi-
zens can confess error, and change their minds when confronted with the
unanswerable, and often objective, arguments of their fellow citizens and
legislators. In a word, an informed citizenry can beat the system. Republi-
canism can find in, or make of, politics something more than a tawdry
race to the bottom. Affirmatively stated, politics offers a calling in which
we can find the highest expression of individual self-worth and respect.
Politics becomes a noble undertaking.
Michelman and Sunstein no longer contrast this republican tradition
with its traditional rivals of empire, monarchy, and feudalism. Today its
modern rival is "interest group pluralism."' Interest group pluralists re-
gard politics as an exercise of will and power. These pluralists believe
that individuals bring their own set of arbitrary, external and unalterable
preferences to a political marketplace, and therein they make "deals" that
leave them better off than before, taking into account their original en-
dowments, the costs of transacting, the perils of political defeat, and the
gains from successful political action. The pluralists, so Michelman and
Sunstein claim, have abandoned any prospect of individual self-realization
through the political process. At its best, the pluralist sees politics as an
extension of market behavior into the political realm. At its worst, the
pluralist recognizes that politics is an endless series of pathological special
interest deals whose sole validation derives from the electoral and the leg-
islative process that generated them.
In stating their positions, both Michelman and Sunstein blur the line
between normative and descriptive theory. As a normative matter it is
clearly desirable that all political and public debates take place with a
disinterested commitment to the common good. As a descriptive matter,
there is abundant evidence that all too often politics is just the way the
pluralists describe it: ceaseless compromises between competing factions,
none of which would pay a nickel to advance the common good, even if
they could identify it. It does not take an elaborate empirical study to note
the powerful influence that individual self-interest exerts over politics. For
example, the United States surely needs military bases. But the country
does not need every base currently in use. Yet what will be the fate of the
Congressman who admits publicly that a base located in his district
10. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1542-47; Michelman, supra note 1, at 1507-08. Note that the
term "interest group" in this description excludes from this pluralist pantheon any political philoso-
phy that simply believes that everyone in society should be willing to accept and tolerate persons
whose beliefs and practices are different from their own. Michelman concurs.
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should be closed down as unnecessary or redundant? Congressmen are
expected to fight for local interests and local constituents. No matter how
lofty their ambitions when they enter public service, they quickly learn
that political survival depends upon their dogged defense of parochial in-
terests against all comers in the political arena." The story about military
bases can be repeated with social security, public works, agricultural sub-
sidies, tax reform, trade regulation, and environmental protection-indeed
with all possible subjects of legislative action, which in the American con-
text is just about everything.
In the face of this massive volume of special interest politics, how can
republicanism be thought to describe the dominant patterns of political
discourse? To be sure, in times of war or grave national catastrophe, we
see less special interest politics and more legislation for the national good.
But even this case hardly proves that self-interest does not dominate polit-
ical action. Rather, it shows that when national survival is at stake, indi-
vidual survival is necessarily at stake as well: we are back to the ancient
problem of the city walls. Under those extreme circumstances, self-inter-
ested people care less for their special interests than they do in normal
times. A tax break for intangible drilling costs does not count for much if
some foreign aggressor stands off our shores. Accordingly, we should see
fewer abuses in times of national travail, but by no means should we ex-
pect them to be eliminated entirely:"2 profiteers flourish in wartime as
well. Once the common peril is gone, politics returns to business as usual.
The level of special interest politics will quickly rise to its former levels,
as its cost to individual practitioners of the art falls.
The picture here may be a bit too stark. There are some persons who
genuinely care about the public welfare: the disinterested career bureau-
crat and the aristocratic public servant are not wholly myths. Similarly,
there are those who honestly believe that the protection of their own spe-
cial interest will advance the interest of the nation as a whole. Sometimes
they will be wrong, as they are when they say, "everyone needs housing,
so we as a nation have to give tax breaks to real estate developers." But
sometimes they are correct, as they are when they say that "rent control
destroys rental housing markets and the communities that this housing
nourishes." Often there is a powerful psychological need to believe that
11. See Barnes, The Unbearable Lightness of Being a Congressman, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb.
15, 1988, at 18. The article traces the career of Congressman John P. Hiler, a graduate of the
University of Chicago Business School, who started out his career as a staunch supply-sider and
champion of small government. A reelection victory by 47 votes persuaded him that he had to spend
an enormous portion of his time defending the prefabricated home industry, which was concentrated
in his Indiana District.
12. The point of the title of Arthur Miller's All My Sons (1949), for example, is that the busi-
nessman who makes defective airplane parts not only hurts his own son, but "all" his sons. In war-
time, the constant refrain of collective concern helps counteract the force of egoism, because it means
that individual actors will not regard losses to others as "external losses" off their own personal
agenda. It is another illustration of the substantive parts of republicanism at work.
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one's own interest advances the public good, even when it does not. While
these complications occasionally cloud the overall picture, they do nothing
to give empirical credibility to the claim that politics will be dominated by
the disinterested pursuit of the common good. If anything, the subtle effect
of unconscious bias may make it exceptionally hard to root out error in
the political context, for so much is at stake. Self-interested behavior may
not be the whole truth of politics, but it is too large a component of polit-
ics for anyone, republican or not, safely to ignore.
III. Two RESPONSES TO PLURALISM
As a descriptive matter, the pluralist can rightly regard both
Michelman and Sunstein less as republicans and more as romantics. As a
normative matter, the situation is somewhat more complex. There are at
least two paths that the pluralists can pursue. One line, for which I have
only modest sympathy, is to argue that the political process "works" and
should be left to stand as it is. Michelman and Sunstein constantly tell us
that politics is a search for the common good through deliberation. How-
ever, they have not operationally defined what that common good is, or
how it is to be reached. Short of the necessary roadmap, all that is left to
guide political decisions in the short run is the very thing they decry: the
pursuit of individual interests as these are subjectively defined by the per-
sons who hold them. So long as the political process contains both electo-
ral checks, so long as majorities can only be assembled through compro-
mise and horsetrading, then pluralism is just fine. 3 The system of
democratic, electoral politics may not look pretty, but it does work. There
is no reason to trade in that system of politics, which has served us well
for some 200 years, for a mysterious and ill-defined ideal, which has yet
to be tested in practice here, or indeed anywhere else in the modern
world. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," or so the defender of pluralism
argues.
The second response to the pluralist description is far more pessimistic,
but I believe, more accurate. While it accepts that there is no collective
way to define what constitutes the good life, it does not think that any
deference should be given to politics, understood as business as usual
under majority rule. The basic position is that pluralist politics may work,
but it still works badly and may be improved by a careful design of the
basic constitutional system in which political action takes place. Here the
argument turns, at least in part, on an issue that both Michelman and
13. See, e.g., Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,
98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983). For a recent judicial expression of the same belief, see Coniston Corpora-
tion v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (rejecting substantive
due process challenge to village zoning decisions): "The check on its behavior is purely electoral, but,
as the Supreme Court stated. . . in a democratic polity this method of checking official action cannot
be dismissed as inadequate per se." Id. at 469.
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Sunstein studiously avoid: what is the relative capacity of competitive
markets and complex political organizations to provide individuals the
goods and services they regard as necessary for the good life? Within this
framework it is possible to argue that competitive markets, if protected
against political manipulation, provide all people more of what they pri-
vately desire than any legislative allocation of material goods and services.
This endorsement of the allocative superiority of competitive markets is
indeed one of the major conclusions of modern welfare economics.1 Even
though people cannot agree upon a single account of the common good,
they can enter into exchange transactions with each other. Price thus be-
comes the transmitter of the social central nervous system that links to-
gether individuals whose personal preferences are otherwise separate, un-
knowable, and incomparable. If I pay you $X for Y good, it means that I
attached a higher private value to Y good than to $X, for otherwise I
would not have entered into the exchange. For your part, you attach a
higher value to $X than to Y good, for otherwise you would not have
entered into the exchange. With a well-defined system of individual prop-
erty rights, each of us can reach higher levels of private satisfaction from
exchange. This happy result can be validated from without, even if the
analyst has no information as to the subjective preferences of any individ-
ual market participants. A competitive market happily removes all the in-
centives to engage in strategic behavior-to conceal preferences, to bluff,
and to deceive. If markets are reasonably well functioning, revealed pref-
erences are powerful evidence of subjective preferences. Only when prop-
erty rights are not well-defined do prisoner dilemma games emerge, in
which the systematic pursuit of individual preferences will lead to a result
that collectively none of the players wants.15 To overcome the inevitable
frictions of ordinary human affairs, the correct uniform response is to
lower the cost of information and bargaining, not to lock in monopoly
returns through political deals.
Unregulated political markets tend to work in very different ways from
a free market. It is now possible for some political coalition to block the
voluntary exchange between private parties. Special interest legislation, on
this account, is any form of legislation that tends to take us further from
the competitive solution. With politics, it is far more difficult to exhaust
all the potential gains from trade because there are so many parties whose
interests must be satisfied before agreement is reached. For this reason,
politics is not a process that works well because the transactional obstacles
that it places in the path of trade are just too great, no matter what the
apologist for democratic pluralism might say. Labor markets, for example,
14. For a very accessible account, see D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY ch. 15 (1986).
15. See, Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, in RATIONAL CHOICE 60 (J. Elster ed.
1986). For an extensive account of these games, see generally R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1982).
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are ordinarily competitive, or nearly so, but not when the state imposes a
system of minimum wages, collective bargaining, or comparable worth.
Protective tariffs, import quotas, discriminatory taxes, and onerous regula-
tions can easily disrupt both domestic and foreign markets in goods and
services. Indeed the world can be filled with large numbers of situations in
which the gains to a cohesive legislative group can be far smaller than the
losses to its disappointed rival, even when the winning coalition is itself a
political minority. In principle, it is conceivable for all losers in the politi-
cal process to band together to bribe the winners to change their votes.
The transaction costs blocking their way are prohibitive, however, so that
large social gains are left unrealized. Politics thus leads to a greater dis-
sipation of private and social wealth through factional struggle-the
"rent-seeking" of modern public choice theory."6 Interest group pluralism
therefore becomes all too accurate as a description of the political process,
but it is the description of a disease, not of a healthy political society.
Given this orientation-and it is one that I generally hold-the busi-
ness of constitutions is not to ratify whatever political deals the legislature
is able to put together, even with full deliberation. Instead it is to try to
find ways to ensure that legislation will work on those things for which
markets fail-such as defense, social order, and other common pool
problems. Likewise, a constitution should curb legislative influence in ar-
eas where markets tend to work-e.g. in the provision of ordinary goods
and services.1 7 It is therefore no accident that many public choice theo-
rists, of whom Buchanan and Tullock are perhaps the most representa-
tive,18 combine a powerful acceptance of the descriptive side of the politi-
cal pluralists with an insistent call for a strong constitutional order which
in every way limits the power of the government to tax, to borrow, and to
regulate. This program, moreover, does not view democratic government,
much less political deliberation, as an end in itself. Instead it views de-
mocracy first as a necessary evil, and then as the best means to a desired
social end: to establish those political institutions which maximize in the
aggregate the satisfactions and preferences that they serve, by insuring the
continued operation of competitive markets in wide areas of human life.
Democratic institutions are far better than the monarchial institutions
that they replace, only because they offer powerful protection against ma-
levolent dictatorship of a single person. But Churchill missed a key point
16. See Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 64
(1974); TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & G. Tul-
lock eds. 1980). For recent suggestions that there are important practical limits on the scope of rent-
seeking, see Flowers, Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation: A Critical View, 7 CATO J. 431 (1987).
Flowers' point is that rent dissipation cannot be total, for if it is, then politicians will not be able to
gain the votes, which are the object of the exercise.
17. I discuss some of these issues in R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 14-15 (1985).
18. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
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when he said that democracy was the worst form of government, except
all the others. Popular democracy can be improved upon by a set of con-
stitutional guarantees that entrench certain individual rights, whether of
speech, property, or religion, against government usurpation. So long as
Michelman and Sunstein recognize, as they do, the problem of factions
and special interests, they must explain, as they do not, why their concep-
tion of republicanism is superior to the Lockean tradition of private prop-
erty and limited government, which has emerged historically as one con-
sidered response to the pluralist nightmare.
Michelman and Sunstein are familiar with this position, and have often
sought to bolster the republican defense by noting that we cannot trust
markets and private choice because the subjective preferences of individu-
als are not "exogenous" to the political and market forces that shape
human beings and what they desire.19 In one sense their point has to be
correct, for everyone has to undergo some form of upbringing, and every-
one knows that what he can purchase in the market is determined at least
in part by what goods are available for purchase. But their great mistake
is to assume that this insight can be applied selectively to those forms of
institutional organizations whose legitimacy they question. The very de-
fect they detect in markets can be found in politics as well, where the
impulse for indoctrination is, if Sparta is our republican model, far
greater. Here too preferences are molded by what persons are taught, and
by what is available. It becomes awkward to make the claim that some
preferences, to wit those of republicans, are untainted, while those of ordi-
nary people unversed in political theory are not. The cynic might well say
that both Michelman and Sunstein applaud republicanism because it gives
skilled academics a comparative advantage: this is the public choice expla-
nation as to why intellectuals prefer politics to markets.2" The less skepti-
cal commentator might simply observe that, if there is a problem with the
endogenous formation of preferences, 21 then no set of institutional ar-
rangements can escape it. At that point, the sensible solution is to diversify
the risks of blindness and error, and that can be done only by sharply
circumscribing the dangerous republican ideal that views government as
the chief architect and teacher of proper preferences. The superiority of
private property and competitive markets is not tied inevitably to some
very simple model of human psychology. It is strengthened when the very
factors that republican theorists point to are taken into explicit account.
19. See, e.g., Sunstein, Legal Interferences With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129
(1986); see also J. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Eco-
nomic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1978).
20. Levy, The Statistical Basis of Athenian-American Constitutional Theory, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming 1989).
21. I think the problem is vastly overstated, and I believe that human personality is far more
stable than this point suggests. See my remarks in Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 41 U. MiAMi L. REv. 136, 136-42 (1986).
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With the tendency for absolutism so strong, better that there be many
absolutisms instead of just one.
IV. GETTING DOWN TO CASES
The weakness of Michelman and Sunstein's republican approach as
against a public choice alternative becomes clearer by looking at the par-
ticular issues that they address. Sunstein, for example, is confident that
considered deliberation can yield the "correct" result on a wide range of
issues ranging from the proper treatment of campaign contributions, to
antidiscrimination laws, to environmental legislation. He offers nothing,
however, but the vaguest sense of what the proper conclusions are, or how
they might be reached in a political setting. In each case what is missing
from his analysis is the public choice perspective, which is important be-
cause it shows how astute, self-interested actors (whose preferences may
be exogenous or endogenous, or both) can defeat the reforms he hopes to
achieve through political deliberation.
A. Campaign Restrictions
Let us start with financial contributions to political campaigns. We are
only told that, as republican principles stress deliberation between politi-
cal equals, there is no principled reason to look askance at explicit govern-
ment limitations upon campaign contributions. These limitations are
designed to curtail the ability of the rich and the powerful to control polit-
ical discourse.22 But dearly this is an issue on which much more has to be
said. The key questions are those which the standard public choice theory
tries to answer: who wins, who loses, and why? The effects are not neces-
sarily those that Sunstein hopes to bring about.
First, it is not clear that restrictions on campaign contributions affect
the balance of political power between rich and poor. In any political
system, there is a divergence of opinion, even among persons of wealth.
Both the Democrats and the Republicans have their own fat cats to turn
to. Without any government regulation at all, therefore, wealth can tend
to cancel out wealth, as it does, for example, in corporate takeovers where
shareholders and officers of both target and acquiring corporations tend to
be large institutions and persons of means. The cancellation may not be
perfect, but by the same token the current regulation may make matters
worse, not better.
Second, restrictions on campaign expenditures cover only some forms of
assistance to political candidates. The limits that these restrictions impose
may have a differential impact upon rival political groups. Since the rules
22. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1576-78. The key case is of course Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976).
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limit the amount of money a person can spend to get into the public eye,
they confer a systematic advantage on people with name recogni-
tion-athletes, movie stars, TV personalities. Similarly, the legislation
benefits persons who rely more on contributions of labor than capital, in-
cluding candidates with access to phone banks, door to door foot soldiers,
mailing lists, college students, club members, union or government work-
ers, and the like. These shifts in the relative importance of input may
affect not only how campaigns are waged, but also who wins. Democrats
appear to be better off with the restrictions than Republicans, but the
effects are doubtlessly more complex than this simple sketch suggestions.
The distortions of the political process manifest themselves in many
other ways. Incumbents, for example, are provided with a raft of free
perks from the government.23 At taxpayers' expense, they can mail news-
letters that inform constituents of what is taking place in Congress. These
newsletters allow Congressmen to campaign on the side, thereby enhanc-
ing their probability of reelection. If campaign restrictions work to the
systematic advantage of incumbents of both parties, then they cannot be
justified as a way to open up the political process, which in fact they close.
How else does one interpret a House reelection rate of 98 percent?24
Finally, any systematic evaluation of campaign restrictions must ask
what regulated persons will do in order to escape the brunt of the regula-
tion without running afoul of the law. One important effect is the chan-
neling of political contributions into special interest groups that are not
subject to similar funding restrictions, whether Common Cause on the
Left or the Business Roundtable on the Right. These groups in turn are
able to play powerful lobbying roles on key issues that arise in Congress.
A troublesome consequence is the rise of single-issuing lobbying-think
only of abortion-which becomes one of the major problems confronting
fatigued elected officials. Party discipline tends to break down under the
pressure of these groups. With more and better funded players, legislative
struggles can become epic, so that regulation has the precise opposite ef-
fect claimed for it. There is more factional intrigue, and less political
equality. Congressmen may find it easier to win reelection, but the price is
rising frustration with the job.2"
These considerations are related to the First Amendment's guarantees
of freedom of speech. I take it as virtually self-evident that restrictions on
campaign expenditures do constitute restrictions on freedom of speech,
and hence are presumptively unconstitutional. The question of their ulti-
mate constitutionality therefore turns on whether these restrictions can be
23. See Jackson, Constant Congress: Incumbent Lawmakers Use the Perks of Office To Clobber
Opponents, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
24. See id.
25. See Wang, Chaotic Congress: Lawmakers' Inability to Clear Up Gridlock Is a Rising Frus-
tration, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
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justified. If the brief account given above is correct, then I am hard
pressed to see what compelling state interests are served by a set of restric-
tions which only skews the political process in ways that reformers neither
foresaw nor desired. In Buckley v. Valeo,2" the Court put the point as
follows: "[Tihe concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment. 2 7 Notwithstanding republican
rhetoric and aspirations, this categorical rule is abundantly justified when
the effect of legislative restraints is solely to work capricious redistribu-
tions of political power that critics of the present order would not defend
on normative grounds. The only way to stop the power of special interest
legislation is to limit the stakes of the political game, and this result in
turn can be achieved only if the courts impose strict limitations on govern-
mental taxation and regulation of private property and contract, limita-
tions that are far more stringent than the highly deferential "rational ba-
sis" test now in vogue.28 I may be incorrect in some of these particulars.
But we develop a far stronger appreciation of constitutional safeguards of
freedom of speech once a public choice view of legislative behavior dis-
places an uncritical celebration of the deliberative ideal.
B. Privacy Rights
The importance of substance is also shown by a brief examination of
Bowers v. Hardwick,29 one of the most bitterly contested decisions in re-
cent years. That case sustained the right of the state to regulate the pri-
vate sexual practices of consenting adults. Michelman disapproves of, per-
haps even deplores, the result in this case. 30 This statute survived the
democratic process in Georgia; and similar laws could be enacted today
elsewhere even after the most impassioned of public deliberations. Here
Michelman would have been better off making a classical libertarian de-
fense against criminalizing certain kinds of sexual conduct even when car-
ried on in private between consenting adults3' than attacking this decision
on republican grounds. With adults we no longer have to worry about the
problems of infants being led astray. With conduct behind closed doors we
don't have to worry about at least one class of external effects upon other
people, who don't have to witness conduct they disapprove of. This brief
account is not an argument about deliberation. It is a substantive argu-
ment, and a powerful one, about individual entitlements.
Alternatively, it is possible to assume the validity of the libertarian
26. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
27. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
28. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner-Elkorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1975).
29. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
30. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 1494, 1520-23, 1533-37.
31. Id. at 1495. There is a hint of this defense in id. at 1497-98.
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framework while arguing that it misses some of the facts of particular
relevance, especially as they relate to the question of external effects. In
an age of AIDS the transmission of sexual diseases should not be stipu-
lated out of the case as was done in Bowers, for its correlation with homo-
sexual contacts is too powerful to ignore. In addition, someone has to
make peace with the identification of more subtle externalities. If the rates
of participation in homosexual activities are higher in men than in
women, then there could be a possible disruption of marriage markets,
owing to an excess of women of marriagable age for whom there are no
available male partners. This is a problem that toleration of some (but not
all) of the practices banned in Bowers might raise. These issues are all of
constitutional dimension, and while I shall not even attempt to give my
views on them here, staunch belief in the deliberative ideal does little, if
anything, to advance the discussion of the thorny issues that Bowers
clearly raises.
C. Environmental Protection and Antidiscrimination
A similar analysis could be made of the environmental and antidis-
crimination legislation mentioned by Professor Sunstein 3 Sunstein as-
sumes that correct deliberation will show the value of government regula-
tion in both of these areas. In so doing, however, he cuts off the possibility
that serious deliberation might yield the contrary conclusions in either or
both of these areas. In his hands deliberation is no longer a neutral pro-
cess consistent with any set of substantive outcomes. Rather it is trans-
formed into the outcomes themselves, which are, however, not given any
independent substantive defense. In dealing with antidiscrimination laws,
Sunstein notes that these statutes will condemn discrimination against
blacks and women. 3 But surely more has to be said before one can argue
that either the equal protection clause or the Civil Rights Acts require or
tolerate affirmative action, as opposed to colorblind legislation, or no legis-
lation at all. Moreover, if the concern is with factions and special interest
groups, then we should look with suspicion on those statutes which guar-
antee "set asides" on government contracts, whether for blacks and other
minority groups, or, in recent practice, for women.3 Surely there is some
risk of factional politics if mayors and commissioners are allowed to dole
out lucrative contracts to their friends. An explanation must be given for
why open competitive bidding, desirable in so many other contexts, should
be so quickly set aside in this context. It is possible that Sunstein could
justify his substantive positions, but that will have to rest on a comprehen-
sive theory that takes into account both individual entitlements and legis-
32. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1574.
33. Id. at 1584.
34. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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lative behavior. Deliberation hardly advances the case; indeed it could lead
to a total rejection of antidiscrimination statutes.
Environmental regulation raises similar issues. Here I think that a lib-
ertarian is comfortable with some form of regulation in at least some
cases.35 Pollution is itself an ordinary tort, for which private remedies are
often an inadequate response. Government regulation offers the possibility
of preventing the harm before it happens and of punishing violators after
the harm has occurred. Utilitarians will tend to see the world in much the
same light. But still one should always be aware that environmental regu-
lation can be severely flawed in its design or execution. The Superfund
legislation, for example, is very troublesome because it imposes liability on
any persons who ever came in contact with toxic substances, even if they
were in no sense responsible for releasing these toxins into the environ-
ment. 8 Worse still, these sanctions are often applied retroactively, creat-
ing enormous dislocations for firms and their insurers. Similarly, much
regulation of air pollution represents not a principled effort to stop pollu-
tion, but the victory of the "dean air/dirty coal" coalition in Congress.
That coalition is an uneasy marriage of eastern coal producers and their
labor unions, and environmental groups. Working together, they have im-
posed a wasteful set of restrictions upon low sulfur western coal in order
to maintain the undeserved market position of the high-sulfur eastern
coal.37 No talk of deliberation explores the relevant choices. Instead, what
is needed is a theory of individual rights which explains why there are
entitlements against pollution, and a theory of public choice which ex-
plains why legislation to protect these entitlements can so easily go astray.
D. Statutory Construction
Finally, I believe that the theory of republicanism is of little help in the
area of statutory construction. Here Sunstein argues that courts should
construe statutes to counteract the deals private interest groups make. 8 In
one sense this task cannot be accomplished within the strict republican
framework because republicanism cannot provide us with the baseline
against which judges can decide whether a certain piece of legislation is in
the public interest or merely symptomatic of some interest-group pathol-
ogy. Again there must be substantive commitments and principles.
Still, even if the republican can identify the corrupt statute, it is not
clear that any canons of construction will be sufficient, or even useful, in
35. See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice.and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 49 (1979).
36. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1982). I have criticized this statute generally in Epstein, The Principles of
Enviro mental Protection: The Case of Superfund, 2 CATo J. 9, 22-28 (1982).
37. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
38. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1581.
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slowing the pace of the special interest politics. Assume that courts make
it clear that they will adhere to a rule that says, in effect, construe all
doubtful statutes to avoid conferring unwanted gains upon special interest
groups. This statute and its effect will be known to political actors once it
is announced by judges. Forewarned is forearmed. If politicians are self-
interested actors, they can be expected to take countermeasures to defeat
its application. Thus once the various interest groups have reached their
private deal, at the very least they then can use clearer language in order
to counteract whatever "constructional" tour de force enterprising judges
can invent. The strategy is not perfect, as the courts could always toughen
the standard of interpretation ex post, but no matter what courts do large
amounts of special interest legislation will work just as its supporters
desire.
Moreover, this judicial strategy of tough construction cuts overbroadly,
for it places all legislation under a pall of uncertainty. The more arcane
the rules of construction, the harder it is for everyone, virtuous or not, to
measure the going judicial "discount" in statutory interpretation. There is
also the further risk that strong-willed courts will use their rules of con-
struction to achieve ends that many people will regard as inappropriate.
Special rules of construction thus create possible abuses of their own, and
in and of themselves they do little to eliminate the stream of special inter-
est legislation.
I believe that there is a counter to special interest legislation. It is inva-
lidation on constitutional principles as they derive from the takings clause,
the religion clauses, the speech clauses, the due process clauses, and the
equal protection clause. But here my views are based on a clear substan-
tive conception as to what falls within the scope of legislative power and
what falls beyond its limits. In making that determination, little turns on
whether the legislature has conformed its conduct to some abstract norm
of deliberation. There is no reason to give statutory language anything
other than its ordinary meaning. What matters is what the legislature has
done, relative to what they are allowed to do-an issue of jurisdiction and
substance, not of terminology.
V. RES PUBLICAE-OR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
In closing, I want to indicate why I think republicanism as a political
philosophy is singularly ill-equipped to answer any serious constitutional
inquiry. Even though Professor Michelman exhorts us to believe in the
existence of a higher normative order, he does not tell us what that order
is or why it should inspire devotion on the part of the citizenry. In a short
comment, I cannot sketch out my own alternative substantive position, but
I believe that we can take a clue from the origin of the term itself. "Re-
publican" is a compound word derived from the two Latin words, "res"
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and "publica," which loosely translated means "affairs pertaining to the
public at large." This linguistic rendition gives a useful clue as to the
proper task of a sound republican political philosophy. As the term "re-
publican" suggests, we must decide what affairs belong to the public de-
bate and discussion. Implicitly both Michelman and Sunstein have an-
swered that question by saying that everything falls within that scope,
because everything may be the subject of political deliberation.
I give a very different answer. I think that the best way to understand
the theory of matters pertaining to the republic is to invoke the distinction
between public and private goods as it emerges- from modern economic
theory. 9 A public good is one in which it is not possible to exclude (at
least at reasonable cost) one person from sharing the benefits of goods and
services that are provided to others. It follows that these public goods will
be underproduced unless there is some way to coerce those who have
benefited from their production into paying some share of its costs. Hence
the argument for having streets, highways and defense funded by taxes.
Where public goods must be provided, someone must answer the ques-
tion of how much of them should be provided, and how the goods pro-
vided will be financed. At root this function is necessarily legislative, and
it is one that should be resolved after deliberation in which all different
points of view are heard before a decision is made. A system of spot mar-
ket transactions, where each speaker pays a determinate price for a right
to speak, will not do the job. No private association, whether charitable or
for profit, requires its speakers to pay for the right to be heard. Quite the
contrary; since the information provided usually benefits the others, there
is as much a need to encourage deliberation as to limit it. Accordingly
rules of order-under which time is rationed not by price, but by queue-
ing-are by market standards better suited for the task than any system of
spot exchanges or auctions. There is no apparent reason why public bod-
ies should follow different rules for their deliberations. And they don't.
Important as deliberation is, however, it is rarely sufficient to prevent
bad outcomes. I do not want to suggest for a moment that simply because
public goods are at issue, there should be no constitutional limitations
upon the power of Congress or the states to tax and regulate public af-
fairs. The system of limited government powers and entrenched individual
rights is needed precisely because legislatures may go astray in spite of, or
even because of, what is said in their collective deliberations. But what I
do want to assert is the converse, that there is a domain of private affairs
largely beyond the power of Congress to regulate precisely because there
is no market failure that requires its intervention.
Viewed in this way, deliberation and practical political reason become
part of a complex story which addresses both the need for and the limita-
39. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcTION (1965).
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tions of legislative action. Limited government, public choice, and private
property all can be integrated into a single theory that incorporates some
portion of the revived republican tradition. But this rival approach is
much richer, for it recognizes that individual self-interest is the engine
both of economic and social advancement and political intrigue. The two
faces of individual self-interest thus create an inescapable problem that
anyone must face in dealing with the first principles of political theory. It
is a problem that simply cannot be answered by assuming that universal
deliberation will provide us with some magic bullet that will cure all our
intellectual and political ills.
